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The King's  Many  Bodies: The Self-Deconstmction of 
Law's  Hierarchy 
Gunther Teubner 
The article connects wo  suands of the recent sociolegal debate: (1) the empiri- 
cal discovery of new forms of spontaneous law in die Course of globalization, 
and (2) the emergence of  deconsuuctive  theories of law  that undemine the 
law's hierarchy. The article puü fonvard the thesis that law's hierarchy has suc- 
cessfully resisted all old and new attempts at its deconsuuction; it breaks, how- 
ever, under the pressures of globalization that produced a global law without 
the state, as self~reated  law  of global society that has no institutionalized sup 
port whaüoever in international poliucs and public international law.  Conse- 
quently, the article criticizes deconsuuctive theories for their lack of autoloa- 
cal analysis. These theories do not take into account the historical condiuons of 
deconsuuction. Accordingly, deconsuucuve analysis of law would have to look 
for new  legal distinctions  that are plausible under  the new  condiuons of a 
doubly  frapented global  society. The article  Sketches  die contours  of  an 
emerging polycontextural law. 
I.  Deconstmcting Systems 
A  fter deconstruction. what is left of law as  a hierarchv of 
rules, founded on a political constitution, endowed with an ihsti- 
tutional  identity, b&ed  on  the distinction  between legislation 
and adjudication and legitimated through democratic represen- 
tation and constitutional rights? Derrida (1990) uses the concep- 
tual  tools of  deconstruction to dismantle the political architec- 
ture of  the legal System: 
Deconstmction is generally practiced in two ways or two  styles, 
although it most often grafts one to  the other. One takes the 
demonstrative  and apparently ahistorical  allure of  logico-for- 
mal paradoxes. The other, more histoncal or more anamnesic, 
seems to proceed through readings of  texis, meticulous inter- 
pretations and genealogies.  (Derrida 1990:957, 959) 
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authority,  to  be  a  grandiose  logiceformal  paradox.  Law  is 
grounded only on itself, based on an arbitrary violence without 
ground, "la fondation mystique de l'autorite." Nor does the gene- 
alogy of legal decisions reveal law's stable identity as a system of 
valid rules, but only exposes law's recurrent aporias, situations of 
undecidability with ever shifting unstable differences in changing 
historical contexts. Law becomes a deconstructed disunity of dis- 
cursive fragrnents which at the same time is haunted by  the never 
satisfiable specter of justice.' 
At  first sight, systems theory stands in stark contrast to the 
intentionally obscure language of deconstructivism, which is not 
willing  to  reveal  its  theoretical  presuppositions.  The  contrast 
holds true for style as well  as for substance. While deconstructiv- 
ism  refuses to define a specific method or determine a guiding 
theoretical intention  (Derrida 1988:82), systemism stylizes itself 
as an orderly theory cultivating conceptual precision and elabo- 
rating systematic theory constru~ts.~  In substance, the theory of 
law  an autopoietic system Stresses law's autonomy, its norma- 
tive  closure, structural determination, dynamic stability, emerg- 
ing eigenvalues in binary codes and normative programs, and its 
reflexive  identi~.~  How  does this  theory respond  to  the  chal- 
lenge  of  deconstruction? 1s  the radical constructivism of  aute 
poietic law the very counter-program to anti-metaphysical  decon- 
structivism? 
"Second-order observation," systems theory's first answer to 
deconstruction, may come as an ~ur~rise.~  ~nstead  of reaffirming 
law as a system of  rules, it observes law as a chain of operations 
that observes other operations under a certain scheme. Thus, it 
does away with any stable identity of  law. "Observing systems" in 
its double meaning dissolves the stable order of legal structures 
into a fluid sequence of differences that acts simultaneously as 
the subject and the object of legal distinctions and indications. In 
second-order observation, law  loses any fixed identity, any well- 
defined ontological status (Luhmann 1989). Rather, law  is  ob 
served  as  an endless play  of  differences,  as an  ever  changing 
transformation of distinctions, as an iteration of recursive events 
that  are  transformed  through  their  resonance  with  changing 
- 
1  For a reformulation of justice as deconsvuction of  law, see Demda 1990959ff.; 
1994:90 n. 8, 102ff.; cf. also Kramer 1991; 1988:422ff.; Cornell 1990, 1992a. 1992b;  Schlag 
1990, 1991; Douzinas & Wamngron  1994. 
2  For a systematic presentation of the theoty of social systems which gives a concise 
definition of iü main concepü and theorems, see Luhmann  1995b. 
3  A useful introduction into basic concepts of legal autopoiesis can be found in King 
& Schütz 1994. Fora recent comprehensive analysis of law in systems terms, see Luhrnann 
1993~;  for English  language accounu, see Luhmann  1985, 1988, 1989, 1992a, 1992b; 
Teubner 1993, 1997a. 
*  For a definition of  this concept see Foerster 1981; for iü relation to deconstruc- 
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contexts  (Teubner 1997a). Diverse contexts construct multiple 
fictions of law, whether they fictionalize law as an effective instru- 
ment of  political change, or as a subtle disciplinary weapon in 
capillary micropolitical power relations,  as a structural basis  of 
institutionalized power politics, as a stable normative framework 
for economic action, as an efficiency-enhancing tool, as a princi- 
pled moral enterprise, a system of  admonitions, or as a rule sys- 
tem  that  claims  formal  validity.  Law's  constructed  identities 
change  chameleon-like  with  the  change  of  observation  posts, 
each of which  has an equally valid  claim  to  truth. There is  no 
stable predefined identity to the legal system but rather a multi- 
plicity of conflicting identities that are constructed in different 
contexts of  observation. Law  is the same and it is not the same. 
So what's the difference between constructing and deconstruct- 
ing legal systems? 
"Paradoxification" is  the second  answer  to  deconstruction 
(Luhmann  1995a). The  prominent  place  given  to  unsettling 
paradoxes by systems theory may again come as a surprise, given 
the value  that theory places on concepts, forms, and systems5 
Indeed, systems theory does not accept at face value the self-styl- 
ization of  contemporary law  as a hierarchy  of  rules where  the 
lower normative acts are legitimated by different levels of higher 
rules that finally end in the constitutional legitimation of  polit- 
ical sovereignty. Nor does systems theory accept the sovereignty 
claims of  law's empire to legal integrity according to which the 
interpretive interplay of  principles and rules allows for the one 
right solution (Dworkin 1986). Rather, it reveals that law's hierar- 
chy  is  in  reality a  self-referential circularity where  validity  be- 
Comes a circular relation between rule maliing and rule applica- 
tion  (Luhmann  1987). The  hierarchy  of  law  appears  both 
entangled and reversed, much like Dumont's  affirmative treat- 
ment and Demda's deconstructive treatment of hierarchies (Du- 
puy 1990).  Moreover, the self-referential character of legal opera- 
tions, the recursive self-application of  legal acts to the results of 
legal acts, lead directiy into perplexing paradoxes  of  self-refer- 
ence. The binary code of  law, the distinction between legal and 
illegal if applied to itself, results in a paradoxical oscillation that 
paralyzes the observer (Teubner 1993:ch. 1).  Systems theory sees 
the whole impressive apparatus of the legal order with its institu- 
tionalized code and programs as founded on a paradox, on the 
violence of an arbitrary distinction. 
Combining both aspects, systems theory reveals the impres- 
sive  architecture of  layers of rule-making authority as  the hard- 
core  reality of  a trompe d'oeil.  The King's  Two  Bodies-the 
grandiose  christological  fiction  of  the  immortal  Sovereign 
For an analysis of the cenual role of paradoxes in the history of law, see Luhmann 
1988. "above" the mortal human being as the supreme source of law 
(Kantorowicz 1957)-have  protected the law  against the decon- 
stniction  of  its foundation and its  identity. The contradictory 
multiplicity of law's identities and the founding paradox of law 
are both to be found hidden behind the facade of law's hierarchy 
at the top of which the King's Two Bodies are governing law's 
empire. The constitutional law construction of the politicai dem- 
ocratic sovereign as the top layer of law's hierarchy has allowed 
the law to externalize its threatening paradox and to hand it over 
to politics where it is "resolved" by  democracy. This externalizing 
maneuver by  constitutional lawyers is equivalent to Hans Kelsen's 
(1971) attempt to externalize the founding paradox of law into 
the transcendentalism  of  the Grundnorm and to H. L. A.  Hart's 
(1961) attempt to conceai it in the social acceptance of the ulti- 
mate rule of recognition. Similarly, the multiple identities of law, 
the uses different sociai contexts make of it, are no longer a mat- 
ter for the responsibility of law but for democratic politics. 
Again, what  is  the  difference  between  constructivism  and 
deconstnictivism? Contrary to the superficial view that is content 
to contrast the antirational gesture of deconstnictivism with the 
superrationalism  of  systems  theory,  a  closer  look  reveals  how 
strikingly similar they are in their theory design. Both are theo- 
ries which, while rejecting unity, identity, and synthesis, begin 
with  difference and end with  difference. Both theories share a 
postmetaphysical, postdialectical, and poststnicturalist character. 
"Systems theory and deconstniction have equally abandoned . . . 
transcendental  philosophy,  ontology,  hermeneutics,  centenng 
the subject, binary logics (included the prohibition of circularity 
in argumentation)" (Hahn 1996284, author's translation). 
Most  of  the  oscillating  concepts  of  deconstnictivism  find 
their stable Counterpart  in the theory of  autopoiesis: Differance 
and the difference-creating  cascades of  distinctions  in various 
contexts;  itkration  and the  recursive seif-application  of  distinc- 
tions that are simultaneously the Same and not the Same; prisence/ 
absence  and the inclusion/exclusion  of  systems of  distinctions; 
supphent and the blind spot of  distinctions, the invisible para- 
site, uiolace de  la fondation  and the arbitrary beginning of  auto- 
p~iesis.~  It is as if simultaneous in(ter)dependent  inventions have 
been made in Paris and Bielefeld. 
Deconstructing systems-the  Oxymoron unites both theories. 
But here is also the point where the bifurcation begins. It is the 
second meaning of "deconstructing systems" that separates them 
and puts them on very different tracks. Systems theory places spe- 
cial emphasis on the second meaning. Not only are systems "pas- 
sive" objects of  deconstruction, systems are themselves "active" 
On differences and commonalities of the wo  theories, see Cornell 1992a, 1992b; 
Fuchs  1995:33ff.; Berg  &  Prangel  3993; Somek  1995:204; Ladeur  1995; Hahn  1996; 
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subjects of  deconstruction  and, most  important, of  seifdecon- 
struction.  I would  even  go  further; I would  submit  that  the 
deconstruction  of  systems  could  not work  without  their  seif- 
deconstruction. 
Systems theoIy does not accept the usual critique that decon- 
structivism is too destructive, nihilistic, critical, radical. Quite the 
contraIy. Deconstmctivism is  not sufficiently critical, not radical 
enough! In  several respects, deconstmctivism does not go far 
enough in mthlessly pursuing its own enterprise. It stops short of 
drawing consequences from its dissolution of stable systems into 
paradoxes and multiple identities. It remains in  the suggestive 
and seductive ambiguities and ambivalentes of  the paradox ex- 
posing itseif to the infinite demands of a transcendence  (alterity, 
justice,  generosity, friendship, democracy, . . .)  which  remain, 
however, forever  indecipherable.  From  a  systems  perspective, 
deconstruction looks a bit like modemity's camival, a funny, ex- 
citing, and at the Same time sad and desperate reversal of its tan- 
gled hierarchies, but basically an entertaining enterprise without 
consequences, in its negative mirror image of entangled and re- 
versed hierarchies ultimately affirming the order of  modemity. 
In what ways  does deconstruction of law not go far enough? I 
see three  roads that have not been  sufficiently explored by  a 
deconstructive analysis of  law: 
1.  Lack of  autologics which results in concealing that a 
deconstmction of  law  is  possible  only  as  law's  seif- 
deconstruction. 
2.  A  performative contradiction  in  the  deconstructive 
gesture, a fascination with  the paradox  that inhibits 
the  deconstruction  of  the  paradox  itseif,  making 
deconstruction  reluctant to  take the risk  of  decon- 
structible unfoldments of  paradoxes. 
3.  Elective finities between legal semantics and social 
structures that make it possible to go beyond purely 
semantic deconstruction and to produce some knowl- 
edge about the postdeconstructive  reality of  law. 
II.  No Consequences 
Deconstructivism is  perhaps the most perplexing but not at 
all the first intellectual movement to challenge law's hierarchy. 
The classics of  legal sociology, Kar1  Marx, Max  Weber, Eugen 
Ehrlich, as well as today's theories-of  legal pluralism, legal insti- 
tutionalism, critical legal theoIy, economic analysis of law, theo- 
ries of private government, theories of legal self-reference-have 
all attacked law's hierarchy with the King's Two Bodies reigning 
in its upper chambers. All  this to no avail, the King's Two Bodies 
carrying on regardless. All  attacks on them tumed out to be ut- terly  unsuccessful  in  the  institutionalized  practices  of  law 
(Wiethölter  1986:53; Heller  1985:  185). Whatever the  nagging 
doubts within legal theory, legal practice is still reproducing its 
operations, interweaving them into an ordered hierarchy of rules 
that draws its legitimacj from a political  (written or unwritten) 
constitution. Despite all contextual relativization, legal practice 
continues to ascribe to itself an autonomous identitv. to use the  ,  , 
institutionalized  distinction  between  legislation  and  adjudica- 
tion, and to legitimate itself by  the appeal to democratic repre- 
sentation and constitutional rights. It seems that the relentless 
deconstruction of law has no consequences (Fish 1989). The re- 
markable thing is  that law's hierarchy has survived and probably 
will survive all subversive discoveries of its tangled, circular char- 
acter, all undermining revelations of its paradoxical foundations, 
all threatening contradictions of multiple identities-if  these dis- 
coveries are not accompanied by  the selfdeconstruction of legal 
practices themselves. 
Let me illustrate this with an example, the law of "private gov- 
ernments." What happened here to the attempts of deconstruct- 
ing law's hierarchy and the unity of state and law? Classical doc- 
trine  of  legal  sources,  not  in  its  sense  as  a jurisprudential 
construct but as the "working theory of practice," as a set of  dis- 
tinctions inscribed in the everyday work of legal institutions and 
effectively used in the ongoing practice of  legal reasoning,  ig- 
nored the phenomenon. According to the traditional doctrine of 
legal sources, normative phenomena outside the legitimating hi- 
erarchy, so-called private regimes of  normative regulation, are 
nonlegal-Savigny  said so  (Savigny 1840:12). They may be any- 
thing-professional  norms, social rules, customs, usages, contrac- 
tual  obligations,  intra-organizational  or  inter-organizational 
agreements, or arbitration  awards-but  never law. The distinc- 
tion law/nonlaw  is  based on law's  hierarchy of rules where the 
higher  rules legitimate the lower ones. Normative phenomena 
outside of  this hierarchy are not law, just facts. After the decline 
of natural law, the highest rule in our times is the constitution of 
the  nation-state-whether  written  or unwritten-which  in  its 
turn refers to democratic political legislation as the ultimate le- 
gitimation of legal validity. In spite of recurrent doubts voiced by 
various movements in legal  theory, judicial  adjudication is  still 
seen as subordinated to legislation. And in spite of even stronger 
recurrent doubts, contractual rule making as weil as intra-organi- 
zational rule production is  still seen either as nonlaw or as dele- 
gated lawrnaking that must be recognized by  the official legal or- 
der. Rule making by  "private governments" is  thus subjugated 
under the hierarchical frame of  the national  constitution  that 
represents the historical unity of law  and state. 
And it is not the recurrent theoretical critique of law's hierar- 
chy but historical developments in the practice of  law  that are Teubner  769 
now breaking this frame. The name of  the great paradoxifier is 
neither  'yacques Derrida" nor "Niklas Luhmann." Its  name  is 
"globalization."~  The recurrent doubts about law's hierarchy so 
easily silenced in the nation-states' past can be silenced no more. 
They explode in the face of  the "statelessness" of  lex  mmcatmia 
and other practices that produce global laws without the state 
(Teubner 1997b). It is globalization of law that is killing the sov- 
ereign-father and making the legal paradox ~isible.~ 
The most successful case of  law without a state has been  lex 
wcatmia, a transnational legal order of global markets that has 
developed outside national and international law.9 Multinational 
enterprises now arrive at contracts which they submit neither to 
national jurisdiction  nor to national substantive law. They agree 
on international arbitration and on the application of a transna- 
tional commercial law  that is  independent of  any national law. 
Among legal practitioners  this has created great confusion. So- 
ber lawyers become very emotional when they have to judge the 
monstrosities of  an "anational" legal order: 
It is difficult to  irnagine a rnore dangerous, rnore undesirable 
and  rnore ill-founded view  which  denies any  rneasure of  pre- 
dictability and certainty and confers upon the parties to  an in- 
ternational  cornmercial contract  or  their  arbitrators powers 
that no  systern  of  law  perrnits and  no  Court  could  exercise. 
(Mann 1984:197) 
Practitioners of international commercial law are involved in 
a battle  about fundamental auestions:  Should  national  Courts 
recognize  lex mmcaton'a's "private justice"  as a new  positive  law 
with transnational validity? Could such an ambiguous normative 
phenomenon which is "between and beyond" the laws of the na- 
tion-states and at the Same time "between and beyond" law  and 
society be applied by  arbitration bodies according to the rules of 
the law of conßicts? Does it contain distinct rules and principles 
of its own?1° Obviously, a new legal practice has been established 
with its own substantive law and its own judge-made law that can- 
not be integrated  in the traditional hierarchies of  national and 
'  The 'globalization"  of law  concept is  somewhar misleading.  It seerns to suggesr 
hat  a rnuluplicity of legal orders is moving toward a unified global legal sysrem. Ir is rnore 
appropnare to speak of a worldwide legal system from the momenr when legal comrnuni- 
carion takes place on a global scale. National  legal orders iri  dieir rum are not autonm 
mous legal systerns; rarher. diey are foms  of territorial dicerentiation of isorldwide legal 
comrnunication  (ser Luhmann 1982; 1993c:57lff.; Schütz 1997).  For analyses of die mu- 
tual impacr of globalization  and law, see Dezalay 1990; Shapiro 1993; Tmbek 1993; Fried- 
man  1996; T~lning  1996. 
I should hasten ro add thar globalizauon is not rhe only paradoxifier of law's hier- 
archy. Here I use ir as a paradigmatic cace for an extemal imtation that triggers law's self- 
deconsmction.  For  other hisroncal  occasions  which  made law's  paradox visible, see 
Luhmann  1988. 
For a recent accounr, see Coorer 1994; Stein  1995; Dezalay & Garrh 1995. 
l0  Cf., for example, Cour d9Appel  de Paris  1.9.1988, Nr. 5953, Revue de l'arbitrage 
1990, 701-712;  13.7.1989, Revue  de l'arbilrage 1990,66%674  (Lagarde); Cour de Cassation 
de Paris 22.10. 1991, Revue de iarb~lrage  1992, 457-461 (Lagarde). international law.  Compared  with  contracting practices within 
national law, what is new is not that private governments produce 
their own laws. Rather it is that they evade the regulatory claims 
of national and international law and practice a legal sovereignty 
of their own. This is the decisive difference between  lex mercatoria 
and other contractual forms which forces legal practice either to 
loosen the connection of its operations to the legal hierarchy or 
to declare the whole phenomenon as nonexistent. 
However,  lex  mercatwia,  the  transnational  law  of  economic 
transactions, is  only one of  the numerous cases of  a global law 
where the Political Sovereign has lost his power.I1 It is not only 
the economy but also various sectors of  world  society that are 
developing a global law of  their own.12 And they do so-as  Gid- 
dens (1990:70) has put it-in  "relative insulationn from the state, 
from official international politics and public international law. 
Interna1 legal regimes of  multinational  enterprises  have  devel- 
oped an impressive body of global law without a state (See Robe 
1997; Muchlinski 1997). A similar combination of globalization 
and statelessness can be found in  labor law; in the  lex  iaboris in- 
ternationalis,  enterprises and labor unions as  private  actors are 
the dominant lawrnakers (See Bercusson 1997). Technical stand- 
ardization and professional self-regulation have developed simi- 
lar tendencies  toward worldwide coordination with  minimal in- 
tervention  of  official  international  politics.  Human  rights 
discourse has become globalized and is pressing for its own law, 
not only from a source other than the states but against the states 
themselves (Bianchi 1997).  Especially in the case of human rights 
it would be "unbearable if the law were left to the arbitrariness of 
regional politics" (Luhmann 1993c:574E., author's translation). 
In the world of  telecommunication, we  expenence the Internet 
struggling for its own  global legal regime. Similarly, in the field 
of ecology, there are tendencies toward legal globalization in rel- 
ative insulation from state institutions. Even in the world of Sport, 
people are discussing the emergence of  a lex  sportiva intenzation- 
alis (Simon 1990; Nafziger 1996). 
While postmodern legal theorists claim to have revealed the 
paradoxical  foundations  of  law  (Kerchove  & Ost  1992), they 
would do better to make the "material basis" responsible for the 
revelation and not the "superstructure." Their blind spot is a con- 
spicuous lack of  autologiis that makes them fail to analyze the 
historical conditions of  their own critique.I5 Deconstruction is a 
universal method which means that virtuallv anv identitv. anv svs- 
'1  For the effects of economic globalization an the development of poliq nerwork, 
that are no langer legally accountable to nation-states,  see McGrew & Leliis 1992. 
12  For  some aspects of global law without the state, see the collection  edited  by 
Teubner 1997~. 
'3  A Statement is autological if it reien to iself ("This sentence has . .  . letten").  A 
rule is  autologicai if it regulates is  own application (e.g.,  a constitution regulating is  own 
transfonation).  .4  theory is autologicai iiit explains its own incidence  (e.g.,  sptems the- tem, any distinction can be deconstructed. This raises then the 
question  under what  historical conditions deconstruction  actu- 
aily has sociai effects in its dissolution of identities and its revela- 
tion  of  paradoxes  and under what  conditions  it  does  not.  It 
seems that deconstruction needs to historicize itself and ask why 
it  has emerged as a successful intellectual  strategy which reso- 
nates  in  society  at  the  end  of  the  20th  century  (Luhmann 
1993br490). 
Having undertaken such an autological analysis, deconstruc- 
tivism  would have  to admit that it  is  a consequence of  crucial 
historical developments in society and culture making such Per- 
plexing  and paralyzing paradoxes visible. These  developments 
create the structurai conditions so that at a certain historical me 
ment, law's foundations are suddenly Seen as paradoxical, among 
others but by no means exclusively by  deconstructivists. The para- 
doxes of  law  could have been revealed at any time in legal his- 
tory-and  actually they have been; however, they had been well 
concealed in socially accepted hierarchical relations. They come 
to the fore only under certain histoncal configurations when the 
ways of concealing them lose their plausibility in the web of other 
distinctions,  when  this  web  is  being  torn  apart,  making  the 
founding paradox reappear. 
In our case of lawmaking without the Sovereign, for centuries 
the strange paradox of  self-validation of contract and organiza- 
tion has remained in a strange twilight. Such phenomena were 
known jurisprudential  conundra, but they remained  latent. To 
be  Sure,  noncontractual  foundations  of  conuact  and  nonor- 
ganizational foundations of organization have been politicized by 
Hobbes, historicized by  Savigny, and socialized by Durkheim. But 
these problems have not been really resolved, rather they have 
been suspended and maintained in their latency. The reasons for 
this latency are historical. The nation-state, its constitution, and 
its law  have provided for the safe distinction between legislation 
and adjudication that was apparently able to absorb all forms of 
"private  lawmaking."  They  replaced  contractual  and organiza- 
tional autovalidation  bv  their heterovalidation. The King's Two  " 
Bodies were suitably nourished to conceal behind them the two 
great paradoxes: the paradox of  the nonofficial law's self-valida- 
tion; and the foundational paradox of the official law itself. Thus, 
the emergence of law's paradoxes was not the ingenious discov- 
ery  of  postmodern  jurisprudence  whose  deconstructive  tech- 
niques reveal law's aporias, antinomies, and paradoxes.  Rather, 
hard-core  social  reality  made  law's  paradoxes  visible-in  this 
case:  fragmerited  globalization.  It  is  the  difference between  a 
highly globalized economy and a weakly globalized politics that 
ory explaining iuelf as a product of hnctional differentiation). For autologics in the law, 
see Luhmann 1993c:31617,  49&99. presses for the emergence of a global law that has no legislation, 
no political  constitution,  no politically  ordered  hierarchy  of 
norms which  could  keep  the  contractual  paradox  latent  (for 
more details, See Teubner 199'ib). The hierarchy of norms did 
not break under the attack of legal theory, but it does break ef- 
fectively when it is deconstructed by  legal practices themselves. 
Perhaps this is one of the greatest difficulties one has to face 
if one tries to transfer the deconstructive enterprise from literary 
criticism and philosophy to institutionalized  social practices like 
law, politics, and the economy. Demda Himself speaks of "hasty 
transpositions"  and "confused homogenizations" (Derrida 1990: 
933). Pierre Schlag tends to think into this direction when he 
Stresses the crucial im~ortance  of "L.A. Lawn aeainst "Law's Em-  " 
pire," the relevance of institutionalized  bureaucratic practices as 
against conceptual legal doctrines (Schlag 1991:890ff.). I See this 
as an important step in overcoming the sociological "thinness" of 
deconstructivism.  There  is  a  sociological  supplement  which 
threatens philosophical deconstructi\~sm.  In systemic terms, the 
supplement would be the distinction between "observation" and 
"operation." The object of traditional deconstruction is  "Law's 
Empire":  seif-observations  of the legal  System, "pure" social ab 
stractions of law,  legal  theones and doctrines, normative argu- 
ments and interpretations. The dangerous supplement wouldbe 
"L.A. Law": elementary operations of law, law's "dirty" social prac- 
tices,  the elementary  dispositions  that effectively change  legal 
structures. And the decisive thing is that those elementary opera- 
tions are not blind power acts but themselves make use of distinc- 
tions.  They observe,  distinguish, and  indicate;  they  construct 
worlds  of meaning-and  deconstruct them. The play of differ- 
ences takes place not only in the argumentative practices of legal 
self-observations but also in the hard-core operations of legal self- 
reproduction. And if deconstruction and self-deconstruc6on are 
to occur, they need not only to reach the legal interpretarion of 
texts but also to connect up with  those institutionalized hard- 
core operations of the law  itself. Look at our example of rule 
hierarchy again: While legal theory has limited its deconstructive 
efforts to concepts of legal hierarchy developed by  legal theory 
and doctrine, today's  globalization of law is deconstructing the 
operative hierarchy itself. The seif-reproduction of law's  hierar- 
chy, questioned for decades by  legal  cntique, effectively breaks 
down under the pressures of globalization. 
However, the questions for deconstructivism  as  a quasi-tran- 
scendental theory are: How much does it cherish its own blind 
spot? 1s it bound to refuse an autological optics which would al- 
low it to See its own historicization? 1s  this theory imprisoned by 
its  self-limitation to  texts  and intertextuality? Indeed, Drucilla 
Cornell's distinction between Systems theory and deconstruction 
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\Gm: "In terms of the relationship between sociology and a quasi- 
transcendental analysis such as Demda's philosophy of the limit, 
this understanding of deconstniction has led to the inescapable 
conclusion that sociology, even its most sophisticated forms, such 
as  Luhmann's  Systems  theory  is  misguided"  (Cornell  199213: 
1599). 
hd  Cornell herself makes a rather limited use of sociologi- 
cal theory to reveal the perseverance of violence in "social reality" 
instead of exploring its liberating autological potential. 
IIi. After Deconstruction? 
If I try to understand with empathy the "ambience" of legal 
deconstructivism, I cannot help but sense a Strange feeling of sus- 
pense, deferral, hesitation,  even a kind  of  paralysis, in  all  the 
frantic moves and countennoves on justice  as the possibility of 
deconstruction  of law and vice versa. Deconstruction 
changes places and dances together with other unstable indica- 
tors such as dij-jferance, trace, icriture, suppht,  blanc, and marge 
around a center which can no longer be charactenzed as either 
present or absent. It is  like  dancing around the golden calf 
while knowing that an  unqualifiable god has already been in- 
vented. Or, in System terms, is deconstmction the self-organiza- 
tion of  this dance, complaining about a lost tradition and be- 
coming, by  this very complaint, dependent upon this tradition, 
so it cannot decide and need not decide whether such a center 
is  or is  not present? (Luhmann 1993a:766) 
"Law and the postmodern  mind"  seems  to be caught in a 
performative contradiction. While relentlessly deconstructing, it 
is  falling  in  love  with  its  object  of  deconstruction.  1s  the 
postmodern mind  trapped in a fetishist relation  to  the decon- 
structed "thing" which makes it impossible for it to suffer the loss 
of this thing and stops it from getting rid of this beloved object to 
make the liberating move beyond?  - 
In  recent  postmodernist  legal  writing-especially  that  of 
Drucilla Cornell, Jack Balkin, Costas Douzinas and Ronnie War- 
rington-you  can sense a suffering from this self-inflicted paraly- 
sis and at the Same time a strong desire to make the liberating 
postdeconstructive move. The question  is  only:  In what direc- 
tion? With growing unease they experience the Open epistemo- 
logical situation in which meaning worlds and knowledge Systems 
are arbitrarily  invented, varied,  collapsing,  reinvented,  varied, 
collapsing . . . . "If you experience that such an infinity is a dead 
end then you search for indicators for steps beyond this diffuse- 
ness which should not be a regressus in the space of the mean- 
ingful world  of  henneneutics"  (Gumbrecht  1991:845; author's 
translation)  . Jack Balkin's "transcendental deconstruction" is one attempt 
to overcome the shortcomings of deconstruction. Ultimately, he 
"relies on the existence of human values that transcend any given 
culture" (Balkin 1994:1138; 1993:124-27;  1987:763). Deconstruc- 
tion becomes for him nothing but a "rhetoncal practice that can 
be used for many purposes depending on the political choices of 
the "deconstnictor," among them the choice for those values. It 
thematizes the "normative chasm between  inchoate human val- 
ues and their cultural articulations" (1994:1177; emphasis omit- 
ted). Thus, justice can never be "fully" achieved; however, as he 
insists against Derrida, this is not "infinite" but only "indefinite." 
Jack  Balkin, at least, has  the Courage to  face the question, 
After deconstruction? And he insists on this even if Pierre Schlag 
(1991:890, 930; 1990:1635) tells him again and again that he is 
asking the wrong question. But  then  he falls back  upon pre- 
deconstnictive positions when he relies on quasi-natural law and 
transcendental existence of values that are only imperfectly ar- 
ticulated. Deconstruction  affects everything, not just  the politi- 
cally incorrect distinctions. It is not a technique that annihilates 
onli my  adversary's arguments and leaves room for my  choices. 
Demda has often distanced himseif from an instrumental-polit- 
ical use of deconstruction, particularly in his cntique of Critical 
Legal  Studies U.S.-Amencan  style  (Demda 1990:933). Decon- 
struction digs deeper and reveals the aponas, antinomies, para- 
doxes that make even more urgent the demands of justice.  In 
Derrida's  words,  these  would  be  the  infinite  demands  of  the 
uniqueness of the Other (not only understanding him, or having 
empathy with  him, or speaking his language, as Balkin has it). 
Thus,  justice is impossible but at the same time cannot be discon- 
nected from law.  It is  "haunting" the law, and the result is  not 
approximation-but  provocation! 
Expose the law to Alterity! This is the route into the aporias 
of deconstruction that other postmodern writers take, following 
Lkvinas's and Derrida's instructions. It is the direct experience of 
the demands of the Other, as  a nonlinguistic, noncommunica- 
tive, nonmediated.perception, the expenence of the nonbridge- 
able alterity, the infinite uniqueness of the Other which  throws 
the objective and general order of law into chaos but at the same 
time  remains  there as  the continuing call for justice  (Levinas 
1979; Dernda 1990:959ff.; 1994:90 n.8, 102ff.).  While Dernda, of 
Course, is  rather elusive about where this road leads to, Comell, 
Douzinas and Warrington  courageously explore this road  (Cor- 
nell 1992a; 1990:1051ff.; Douzinas & Warrington  1994:ch. 4, 6). 
Where do they arrive at?  At the recommendation thatjudges take 
the legitimate concems of suppressed  minorities into account. 
Laudable as this is  as an ethical imperative, as a result of  their 
ambitious theorizing it is  somewhat disappointing. Does an ap- Teubner  775 
peal for human nghts become more convincing after the detour 
via deconstruction? 
There are more fundamental doubts about the combination 
of deconstruction and alterity to which I can only allude here. 1s 
the uniqueness of the Other indeed the ultimate expenence that 
remains after deconstruction? Systems theory would argue that it 
is rather the expenence of the "blind spot" of any distinction that 
makes the quest for its immanent "adequacy" and its transcen- 
dent "justice" even more urgent. By  no means would Systems the- 
ory dismiss as irrelevant the question for law's transcendence that 
is at the core of Alterity. However, this question would be raised 
not only in relation to human beings in their unique singulanty. 
The fundamental  inadequacy  of  communicative practices  not 
only to the other but to the world is an expenence that accompa- 
nies it from the beginning. Attention is then drawn to the "injus- 
tices" that social discourses, among them law, create for the con- 
sciousness  and  the  bodies  of  people, for  the balance  of  the 
ecology, and, last but not least: fo;  other communicative prac- 
tices themselves. 
To be sure, it is an important Inove of deconstructive justice 
to reintroduce boldly the dimension of the sacred into the law. 
Deconstructive justice cannot be equated with any standard inter- 
nal to the law; at the Same time it is not an extralegal political or 
moral  standard. Deconstructive justice  does not iepresent any 
immanent principle of society. It addresses directly the transcen- 
dence of law. By  stressing the unbndgeable divide between law 
and  justice and its simultaneous nonseparable intertwinement, it 
reformulates a relation of law  to the sacred  that has been lost 
with  sec~larization.'~  And  it  is  remarkably different  from  the 
usual bridging of law and religion, of legal doctnne and theol- 
ogy.  Rather, deconstructive justice  Opens the expenence of an 
areligious, an atheological transcendence that makes a political- 
legal  reflection  of  the  transcendent  dimension possible,  even 
under the contemporary condition that "God is dead." This is a 
bold and powerful thought and introduces into legal thought a 
difference that makes a difference. 
However, I do not share the juridical  Derridites'  optimism 
that such an expenence of law's  transcendence would inspire or 
even  guide political  and legal  activism. I  do not deny that it 
makes  an important difference in the  practice of  politics and 
law-extreme  demands of a justice  that  can never be realized, 
the almost unbearable experience of an infinite responsibility, a 
sense of fundamental fai1;re  of law, even a tragic experience that 
whatever you  decide in law will  end in injustice and guilt.  But 
how should this expenence ever guide political legal  action in 
l4  -The law is rranscendent and theological,  and so always to come, always prom- 
ised, because it is immanent, finite and so already pat" (Demda 1990:993). the sense of designing legal rules of minority protection, immi- 
grants' and women's rights? 
Drucilla Cornell sometimes relies on the dimension  of time 
(Cornell 1990:1062).  Justice does not reveal itself before the fact. 
But does she do so post hoc? 1s there any judge for the infinite 
responsibility within a reasonable amount of time? Are not the 
demands of justice forever indecipherable? 1s not the justice  a- 
vair,  which means forever a-uair and never present or past? The 
instrumentalization  of  deconstructive justice  for poli%cal  and 
doctrinal purposes means to desacralize it, to level the deep di- 
vide between legal-political imrnanence and transcendence. 
Does Derrida's own deconstruction of Levinas help (Demda 
1978)? He argues against Levinas that ethical asymmetry is in 
danger of being reduced to an excuse for dornination and vio- 
lence if it is  not supplemented by  phenomenological symmetry. 
The Other needs to be recognized phenomenologically as alter 
ego. But what else than a vague humanitarian irnpulse can one 
expect for law from phenomenological symmetry as deconstruc- 
tion  of  the  philosophy  of  alterity?  I  cannot  See  how  such  a 
"deconstructiksm &th.a  human face" will  give any meaningful 
orientation in the face of the urgent question how law copes with 
the demands of justice in today's supercomplex society. It is not 
by  chance that the legal and political applications of deconstruc- 
tion restrain themselves wisely to the relatively simple conflict be- 
tween  minorities and the state where it is relatively easy  to  be 
partisan  (Cornell  1992a; 1990:1051ff.; Douzinas  & Wanington 
1994:chs. 4. 6). But thev remain silent when it Comes to conflicts  ,  , 
between human rights, not to speak of collisions between incom- 
patible worlds of  meaning. And  even if  we  insist on the funda- 
mental divide between law and  justice that denies thatjustice can 
be translated into law, do we  not need to search for an adequate 
conceptualization of the human condition at the end of the 20th 
century that tells us more about our society than a mere mystical 
appeal to alterity? It seems that even the most "ethical" interpre- 
tation of "affirmative" deconstruction remains caught in the par- 
adoxical  relation  between  an immanent law  and transcendent 
justice  (cf. the critique by Vismann  1992:261). 
What is needed is a self-transcendence of deconstruction  it- 
self.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how  deconstructivism  explicitly 
avoids self-application. It refuses to apply its operations to its own 
core distinctions. It grants itself a Strange self-exemption  that is 
the very  cause of  its paralysis:  '3ustice in itself, if  such a thing 
exists, outside or beyond law, is  not deconstructible.  No  more 
than  deconstruction  itself,  if  such  a  thing  exists"  (Demda 
1990:945). 
The deconstructive dance, if  such a thing exists, may  over- 
come its paralysis once it acknowledges that deconstruction itself 
can be deconstructed. Paradoxification itself is a paradoxical op Teubner  777 
eration. In its oscillations it has two sides. On its "logical" side, it 
oscillates between the positive/negative  value of the distinction 
and ~aralvzes  the observer. On its "rhetoncal" side. it oscillates  ,  , 
between paradoxification and deparadoxification. &d  it is time, 
the temporalization of the paradox, that leads out of permanent 
oscillation. It shows what the game of deconstruction is about: an 
almost rhythmically pulsating  movement from hiding the para- 
dox, to revealing it, to hiding it again. . . . Thus, deconstruction 
need not remain the dance of paralysis, rather it may turn out to 
be the very  provocation  for inventing new distinctions!  Decon- 
structible distinctions, of course! Distinctions that for  the time 
being hide the paradox anew and await its future revelation. 
Returning to our exarnple, the law of private governments in 
the global society, where is the new hiding place for the founding 
paradox of  law  to be found once the protective  rule hierarchy 
has been deconstructed? If we  take the risk of inventing decon- 
structible unfoldments of the paradox of law, should we  search 
for it in the direction of a "polycontextural" law that would not 
be hierarchical, but heterarchical, a law with  multiple sources, a 
law without a unifying perspective, a law that is produced by  dif- 
ferent mutually exclusive discourses in society (Günther 1976b)? 
Law remains the Same but appears as different depending upon 
the diverse social discourses that "produce" it. The Same is differ- 
ent. The traditional hierarchical differentiation of law into legis- 
lation  and adiudication would  be  re~laced  bv  a  heterarchical 
J 
multitude of legal orders structurally linked to other discourses. 
Those links would a circular seif-referential way  be connected to 
each other. Political legislation loses its privileged place and be- 
Comes just  one peripheral  mode  of  lawmaking  among other 
forms of  plural law  production. The patchwork  of  ethnic and 
religious minority laws, mles of standardization, professional dis- 
cipline,  contracting,  intra-  and  interorganizational  rule  mak- 
ing-all  the  different  modes  of  Michel Foucault's  (in)famous 
"normalisation" (Foucault 1979:ch. 3, 2)-would  be equally valid 
forms of law production. Thus, the founding paradox of law hith- 
erto hidden  in the one great fiction of  the Political Sovereign 
would  now be dissolved into a multiplicity of  paradoxes of self- 
validation. The One King has Two, Three, Four, . . . , Many Bod- 
ies! 
The multiple laws of polycontexturality hide their paradoxi- 
cal self-validation in an "as if." Each of them has its own fictitious 
founding myth. None  of  them  has a clear-cut histoncal begin- 
ning. Rather, the beginning is in the middle! It is like in the fa- 
mous "Glas" by  Jacques Dernda  (1974) where  the text  has no 
beginning but begins in the middle of  a story that had already 
started. The recursive operations of  each of  these  polycontex- 
tural laws cannot begin ex nihilo; they can only refer to sornething 
that already exists. But due to their very recursivity they cannot refer to something outside of their chain of recursions; it must be 
something within  this  chain  to  which  they  refer.  hd  if  this 
"something" does not exist, they have to invent it! These laws as 
Systems of recursive legal operations can only refer to past legal 
operations. The solution again is an "as if," but not the fiction of 
a founding myth as a seif-observation, rather as the fiction of past 
legal decisions as bases for recursive  operations. 
W.  Elective Affinities: Legai Semantics and Social 
Structure 
Mihat gives us the certainty that such a concept of "polycon- 
textural law" is not in its turn susceptible to philosophical decon- 
struction? Or,  worse, that it will not be the victim of its omvn  seif- 
deconstruction? Nothing, of Course. And one thing is certain- 
that it can be deconstriicted. Postdeconstructive distinctions are 
not immune against  their deconstruction, they  are themselves 
deconstructible. But the crucial question is: What are the condi- 
tions for their temporal stability? This is the point where second- 
order observation  goes beyond deconstruction  insofar as it ob 
serves how the nsk of an deconstructible unfolding of the para- 
dox is  taken. U'ho  is  the observer who  takes  this  nsk? Mihen? 
Under what social structural conditions? 
Here, sociology of law Comes in a second time. Now, it is  no 
longer the question of what are the histoncal conditions for law's 
selfdeconstruction, in other words, the question, Mihen do law's 
operations clash with its observations so as to inake the paradox 
visible? Rather, a sociological analysis would introduce here the 
elective affinity between legal semantics and broader social struc- 
tures in order to explain if and why the "unfoldment" of the par- 
adox has a certain social plausibility. Indeed, it is the specter of 
Man< that is haunting us here, with its tnad of modes of produc- 
tion, class structure, and law  as  one among several  ideologies. 
The new tnad-differentiation,  social structure, and legal seman- 
tics-makes  it clear that contemporary society is  the result of a 
structural  and  semantical  catastrophe.  The  catastrophe  hap 
pened in modernity, and postmodernity's fate is to become pain- 
fully aware of its negative consequences. 
If this is so, the deconstruction of our metaphysical cradition is 
something we  can do now. But if  so, it would be worthwhile to 
choose the instruments of  deconstruction 14th sufficient care 
so  hat by  using them we  could  gain some information about 
our  postmetaphysical.  postontological,  postconventional, 
postmodern-that  is  pos~catastrophical  condition. (Luhmann 
1993a:777; emphasis omitted) 
This would be the step beyond Dernda's recommendation of 
"walking through the desert," the "necessanly indeterminate ab 
stract, desert-like expenence that is confided exposed, given up Teubner  779 
to its waiting for the other and for the event" (Derrida 1994:90). 
He maintains that in spite of the unbridgeable gap between do- 
ingjustice to the uniqueness of the Other and the calculations of 
law  that deconstruction  reveals,  one nevertheless  should  con- 
tinue the search for justice  and "negotiate" the uniqueness with 
the  generality, objectivity, calculability of  law.  But  here is  the 
source for the paralysis: Deconstruction itself cannot furnish cri- 
teria (Vismann 1992:264). This leads to the unmediated confron- 
tation of a deconstructed  law with  the infinite demands of Jus- 
tice. Law  in ruins is  haunted by  the specter of Justice. In such a 
situation what can one expect from "negotiation"? 
Demda criticizes  Benjamin's  appraisal  of  divine  violence 
which  human  beings  cannot distinguish  from  mythic violence 
(Denida 1990:1033ff.). Tu quoque,  Iacobus! He exposes himself to 
a similar critique. In spite of all recurrent appeals to negotiation, 
deconstruction leaves us in a situation of an unbearable responsi- 
bility. "Before the law" of deconstructivism, we  live under the infi- 
nitely heavy demands of an inaccessible authority the commands 
of which we  cannot decipher. Derrida puts himself under the ob 
ligation of a promise: "And a promise must promise to be kept, 
that  is, not to  remain  'spiritual'  or 'abstract',  but  to  produce 
events, new effective foms  of action, practice, organization, and 
so forth" (Derrida 1994:89).15 
But it is not very convincing to appeal-as  Derrida does-to 
second-best solutions if he cannot say anything about the direc- 
tion  into  which  one  should  move  "negotiations"  and  "com- 
promises." Are such empty criteria of second best all that's left 
after deconstruction? 
Against this, the instruments of deconstruction would need 
to be directed  not only at revealing the multitude  of  meaning 
and the underlying paradox and to confront this with the haunt- 
ing demands of an ever distant justice, but also at finding out 
something  about  the  situation  after  the  catastrophe,  in  the 
Master's voice, and at fomulating what the intended "maximum 
intensification  of  a  transformatiön  in progress"  could virtually 
mean in an "industrial and hypertechnologized society" (Derrida 
1990:933). And for this purpose it is important to see that after 
deconstruction, not only is one exposed to the unbridgeable gap 
between a deconstructed law and a transcendent justice  that al- 
lows only bad compromises and negotiations but also to the pos- 
sibilities of  new  distinctions  creating  worlds  of  meaning  that 
would mediate  between  deconstructed  law  and deconstructing 
justice.  What  would a  possible new  correlation  between  social 
structures and legal semantics look like that allows at least for a 
transitory deparadoxification? What are the foms  of social differ- 
'5 Derrida  often expresses strong self-obligations for political action as  a conse- 
quence of deconsuuctive activities, e.g., Derrida 1990:930-31. entiation that give a temporary plausibility and social acceptabil- 
ity for new legal distinctions? 
Again, law's  globalization seems today to be the key to under- 
standing the differentiation of a social structure that tolerates a 
different legal semantics which would sufficiently displace  and 
conceal law's paradox, at least for the time being. Globalization 
breaks the link connecting law to the democratically constituted 
political discourse. It exposes law directly and without the media- 
tion of democratic politics to the fundamental social condition of 
today's  world  society:  to  its  "double  fragmentationn-cultural 
polycentrism  and  functional  differentiation  (Sinha  1995; 
Luhmann 1995a). This may give a sociological direction to the 
search for postdeconstructive  distinctions. One would  look for 
legal semantics that reflect  and endure this double fragrnenta- 
tion. The search is for legal distinctions that will not be under- 
mined  by  polycentricity but will  rather take it for granted and 
build on it. "Ubi societas ibi ius" (Grotius). What does law  look 
like in a doubly fragmented world society? 
Let us have a closer look at our King's Many Bodies. Could it 
be that the postdeconstructive  concept of polycontextural law, 
the laws of the many discursive sovereigns, has an elective affinity 
to this double fragmentation of world society? Does a polycontex- 
tural law meet the conditions of  historical plausibility and social 
acce~tability  in  times  of  globalization? How  can  one be  Sure  ., 
whether polycontextural  law  is  not in itself a regression to pre- 
deconstructive conce~ts?  I have onlv ~reliminam  answers: One is  ,  L 
"transjunctional operations," another is multiple extenialization 
of the paradox.  - 
A first  tentative  answer might  be  found in  the  "transjunc- 
tional operations" that constitute different forms of  law  where 
there is  no political  sovereign. The structural reason for such 
apolitical law production  is "that on the global level there is  no 
correspondence for the structural coupling of politics and law via 
a constitution" (Luhmann 1993c:582).  Thus a different logic of 
norm  production  and of  legal  argumentation is  required:  "A 
legal theory in line with the times ought to reorient itself and its 
concepts to a heterarchically relational logic of linkage, if  it is to 
find  the  functional  equivalent  to the  stable  relations  between 
subject and general reason, between individual case and norm" 
(Ladeur 1995). 
Under conditions of  the nation-state, standard setting, pro- 
fessional self-regulation, and intra-organizational  legal  regimes 
are strongly politically mediated when they are to be transformed 
into valid legal rules. Under conditions of globalization, however, 
private  governance  regimes  lose  this organizational  and legiti- 
matin~  mediation and can be institutionalized onlv as forms of a 
U 
close contact between operationally closed Systems, without me- 
diation by  institutionalized politics. These are institutions-I  call Teubner  781 
them "linkage institutionsn-that  create new law directly by  trans- 
junctional  operations without being translated  into political is- 
sues. In their ongoing procedures they operate in terms of more 
than one binary code which  they treat with  conjunctional  and 
disjunctional operations. They  operate-within  one institution 
but over the boundaries of two  or more operationally closed se 
cial  systems-with  several  binary  codes  and  connect  them 
through  transjunctional operations (Günther 1976a). They cre- 
ate a rejection value that negates the binary codes as such. They 
contain "a deeper twevaluedness that encroaches on the classical 
opposition of positivity and negation and contains it as a special 
case. This further transclassical twevaluedness is  the alternative 
between  acceptance  and rejection value"  (Günther 1976a:28). 
For exarnple, one might look at technical standardization, where 
such standards are elaborated in the frame of the true/false  dis- 
tinction  of  science.  Then  the  rejection  value  is  introduced 
against the acceptance value of  the scientific binary code. This 
Opens the road to a rnultiplicity of other codes. The standard is 
"translated" into the economic, political, ecological, or legal dis- 
Course. It is recontextualized in the languages of those discourses 
and takes on different meanings (antonyrn substitution; Holmes 
1987:25ff.). Thus, linking institutions have  the capacity to take 
into account the multivalued character of a fragmented society. 
However, with the interplay of  binary codes on one level and ac- 
ceptance and rejection value on another level, the linking institu- 
tions still work with  manageable  binary distinctions since they 
create  multiple  different  layers  of  a  twevaluedness.  Thus, we 
have  in the case of  linkage institutions a semantics of  law  that 
seems to be calibrated directly to the double fragmentation of 
world society. 
Another answer might be found in the multiple externaliza- 
tion  of  paradoxes. The paradoxes  of  self-validation would  not 
vanish but would be concealed by being externalized to the social 
practices with which they have close contact. Polycontextural laws 
externalize their paradox by  creating their own myths of origin. 
These are fictions of their foundation which are based, neverthe- 
less, on ongoing outside processes. 
It is  the fragmented order of diverse discourses outside of the 
law where we  find the external on which the fictions of polycon- 
textural laws depend. It is not only a psychoanalytical experience 
where the client, to escape the circularity of  self-reference, in- 
vents a fictitious heterereference in the Person of the therapist 
to whom the full knowledge of the Symptom is attributed. Zizek's 
analysis applies similarly  to  the  emergence  of  polycontextural 
law: 
it is only the illusion of  a pnor knowledge that in  the end pre 
duces actual knowledge. Here lies the fundamental paradox of 
the  signifjing process. The  only  possibility  of  creating  new meaning is to go through the illusory premise that this howl- 
edge already exists. (Zizek 1992:iV.2.5) 
There must be enough nonlegal meaning material that law 
can misunderstand as legal precedent. There must be a historical 
"situation in which it is sufficiently plausible to assume that also 
in former times legal rules have been applied" (Luhmann 1993c: 
57). An  example would be an international transaction that has 
taken place outside the frame of any national contract law. The 
Strange fiction is that its expectations are law which needs to be 
judged according to an existing legal order. Lex mcatmia refers 
either to a rich fund of commercial practices, which has evolved 
under the chaotic conditions of the global market or, should one 
say, to the practices that have been imposed by  the stronger ece 
nomic  interests. At  present, in  an arbitration  context, lawyers 
pretend  that  these  merely  social  expectations  are  the  law  to 
which legal decisionmaking can refer as precedents. Arbitrators 
in  commercial  disputes  pretend  that old  arbitration  cases de- 
cided according to equity are precedents for them and begin to 
distinguish and to overrule. The paradox of contractual self-vali- 
dation can now be hidden in the infinite history of age-old com- 
mercial usages. 
In a similar vein, organizational Patterns and routines have 
evolved within  a multinational  organization. The fiction  is  cre- 
ated that these rules are labor law. The paradox of its self-valida- 
tion will be concealed in the routines of an organizational hierar- 
chy. Equally, an enterprising inhabitant of cyberspace delineates 
a limited  chunk, demands  money for access, and pretends to 
have  created  legal  property.  Such  are historical  situations  in 
which  polycontextural law  creates its recursivity based  on ficti- 
tious precedents and conceals its paradox in nonlegal discourses. 
V.  The King's Many Bodies Are Invisible 
How would  this image of a continual paradoxification and 
deparadoxification of law change the perception of basic institu- 
tions of law? Can we  develop normative perspectives of those in- 
stitutions' transformation  in  a postdeconstructive spirit? 
It would be tempting to declare law's major task as Making 
the King's Many Bodies visible. Haunting the new lawlords: nam- 
ing, blaming, claiming-the  attribution of lawmaking creates a 
new visibility. There are tendencies in legal pluralism that indeed 
point in this direction.I6 "Private governments" have deficiencies 
in  their  public  character, but  they can  be  made accountable. 
"Quasi-political regimes" are dictatorial, but they could be made 
'6  For recent analjses of legal pluralism and its nonnauve implicauons, see Petersen 
& Zahle 1995, Gerstenberg 1997 Teubner  783 
more democratic. "Nongovernmental actors" behave irresponsi- 
bly, but they could be made responsible for their actions. 
However, here the othenvise fruitful metaphor of the King's 
Many Bodies seems to become misleading. It is fruitful insofar as 
it reveals the multiplicity of fictions that have replaced the one 
great fiction of the iaw-@roducing  Sovereign. But it becomes mis- 
leading if  it makes us  think  that double fragmentation of  the 
world  society means that political power  on the global  level is 
nothing but decentralized, that legislative sovereignty is only dis- 
persed in identifiable decisionmaking Centers. This would be an- 
other regression to predeconstructive distinctions, this time not 
of  a  moral but  of  a  political  character. It would  Support  the 
wrong analogy to political sovereignty: action, power, influence, 
manipulation, responsibility. 
Like the selfdeconstruction of law's hierarchy, we  must face 
the seifdeconstruction of political power, domination, and sover- 
eignty  in  the  world  society.  The  autopoietic  deconstruction 
makes  us See  world  society as  a society without hierarchy and 
without a sovereign. To be Sure, world society is nfe with violence 
and repression, but it is not a society steered by  political domina- 
tion. The result of  globalization  is  not just  a multiplication  of 
sovereigns producing laws for their little domains. Rather, global 
law is dominated by its blind environments, by the systems of its 
inner societal  environment. And the decisive thing is  that this 
domination  does not work  in a  ~oliticallv  attributable  and ac- 
countable way, rather 
its project is  the replacement of  hierarchy-and  autarky-by 
heterarchy. This means that arkhi (mastery) is located neither 
at an  uppermost level-it  is  not hierarchy, mastery by  name 
and for the sake of  the holy (an absolute and externally given 
qua1ity)-,  nor within  the System itself-it  is  not autarky, self- 
mastery or self-sufficiency. Arkhl  (mastery) is  located outside 
and in front of  the System, that is, just beyond the system's bor- 
ders with its accompanying other or heteros. The role of  the ac- 
companying other, or Partner or heteros  of  heterarchy, is  per- 
formed not by  the environment-which  cannot perform any 
role-but  by  other  systems present  in  the  system's  environ- 
ment. Yet, even this relationship is structured by  the distinction 
system/environment: If  one dealt in systems only, heterarchy 
would  be unthinkable. Heterarchy is, of Course, a paradoxical 
mastery-a  mastery without a master. (Schütz 1997:275) 
If this is so, then a "constitution" for polycontextural law can- 
not simply extend the historical expenences of the political con- 
stitutions  per  analogiam.  Curbing abuses  of  power:  that  great 
fonnula of  the  legal  tradition  will  not help in  "ci\~lizingn  the 
King's  Many Bodies. We must face the impossibility of constitu- 
tionalizing legal multiplicity in the language of legal restraints on 
the arbitranness of the sovereign. The new reality, it is  true, is  lack of  a meta-ricih lack of soci- 
ety's comprehensive political rationality. However, Systems theory 
would urge us to realize that in spite of all deconstmction, social 
subsystems relentlessly stick to their institutionalized "iron laws" 
of  superspecialized  rationalities.  They  are  highly  rational  in 
themselves, but wirh regard to the whole society they are blind, 
uncoordinated, selfish, chaotic, expansive, and imperialistic. In 
its double fragmentation, world society tends to develop selfde- 
structive tendencies. Thus, a "constitution" for polycontextural 
law would need to redefine its focus: from the sovereignty of poli- 
tics to the domination of  the many environments and from the 
sovereign's abuse of power to selfilestructive tendencies of col- 
liding discourses. 
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